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INTRODUCTION

Assuming the defendant were to have lost some currency,
he, alone bears the risk of loss, and his loss is fixed by the amount
of currency he lost. Should he, however, lose his credit card,
the amount of loss would not be fixed, and the risk of loss is not
only borne by him, but also by the Company when he actually
complies with the conditions of the issuance of the card to him.'
The Great Credit Card Society of the sixties has come a long way
from the modest department store charge plate society of the early
nineteen hundreds. The cashless customer in the department store who
used (and still uses) his credit card or charge plate to purchase goods on
a revolving line of credit has come full circle: he now uses credit cards to
obtain cash. The pun that "cash is a poor man's credit card ' 2 now has
validity.
With all of the increase in the availability and use of the credit card,
there has been little change in the conceptual and business framework
underlying their use. In the two-party credit card arrangement-exemplified by the department store credit card or plate-the customer agrees
to pay for his credit purchases in one lump sum at the next regular billing
date, or he may place his charges on a revolving line of credit basis. There
* Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Miami. The author would like to
express his appreciation to the many credit managers and attorneys for their labor in answering the author's questionnaire. I am sure that it has been as exasperating an experience for
them as it has been a frustrating experience for me. Anyone contemplating empirical research
in law should abandon the notion unless some foundation is willing to underwrite the task.
1. Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein, 229 N.Y.S. 2d 51, 55 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1962).
2. NEWSWEEK, Aug. 22, 1966, at 84-86.
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may be, of course, a combination of these payment plans. These credit
cards are then used by the customer in making purchases at the store of
the issuer and the store's salesman may be required to telephone the
credit department on each sale in order to ascertain if the purchase is
within the limit of credit set by the store for this particular customer;
the card may contain a symbol which indicates the credit limits of
this customer, but the telephone call is used to ascertain if the credit limit
has been expended by prior purchases.'
The three-party credit card system-exemplified by American Express, The Diner's Club, Carte Blanche, etc.-involves a contract between
the issuer of the card and the holder; it also involves a series of contracts
between the issuer and numerous retail merchants, motels, restaurants, etc.
The holder of the card agrees to pay the issuer for all of his credit purchases (in one lump sum at the next regular billing date or on a time
payment basis) made at retail merchants, motels, restaurants, etc., by
means of his credit card. Prior to this contract, the issuer has entered
into numerous contracts with retail merchants, hotels, restaurants, etc.,
agreeing to purchase the amount of their credit card sales-sometimes
known as charges-on a weekly or monthly basis. If the issuer is an
independent credit card company it may purchase these "charges" at
discounts ranging from three to as high as ten percent depending upon
the nature of the retail establishment, its volume of sales, etc. If the
issuer issues credit cards as part of its promotional efforts to increase
sales of its products-for example the oil companies-it will purchase (or
allow a credit against purchases from the oil company) the "charges" at
the full retail price, at "par."
The latest development in the use of credit cards has been to obtain
cash or a line of credit. Hundreds of banks have issued hundreds of
thousands of credit cards which enable the holder to secure an installment
loan from the bank, to cash bank checks (which resemble a hybrid of
postal money order and a cashier's check) and to overdraw his checking
account and cover it by a loan.'
Responsible authorities visualize the day when credit cards will not
only take the place of cash but of checks as well. The credit card will
be used in conjunction with computers which will be connected with
3. For a brilliant legal and conceptual analysis of the credit card, see Comment, The
Tripartite Credit Card Transaction: A Legal Infant, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 459 (1960). Unfortunately, the courts citing this pioneering work have decided the cases in a rather
pedestrian manner. See also Comment, Applicability of Exculpatory Clause Principles to
Credit Card Risk Shifting Clauses 22 LA. L. REv. 640 (1962) and 30 ALBANY L. REV.
79 (1966). The revolving credit arrangement is discussed in a Comment, Regulation of
Consumer Credit-The Credit Card and the State Legislature, 73 YALE L.J. 886 (1964);
TIME, Apr. 27, 1967, at 91-92. Davenport, Bank Credit Cards and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1 VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 218 (1967) which was published after the completion of
this article.
4. Supra note 2.
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computers in the customer's bank. The salesman will record the sale on
his computer and the checking account of the customer will be debited
automatically. This system, or something like it, will be needed to reduce
the amount of check "float" between banks-over fifty million checks a
day are now "floating" between banks and the flood of paperwork will
soon become overwhelming.'
In addition to the obvious danger of the unwise use of credit cards
by the holder resulting in debts that he is unable to pay, there is the
less obvious danger that a thief or finder may impersonate the holder and
use his card to incur charges which will be assessed against the holder.6
Virtually all credit cards today attempt to shift the risk of unauthorized
purchases to the holder until he gives the issuer written notice of the loss
or theft of the card. This risk shifting process goes through three stages
in the three-party credit card arrangement. The card holder is supposed
(in the view of the issuer) to bear the risk of loss for all purchases made
by an imposter between the date of loss of the card and the time that
written notice is received by the appropriate office of the issuer. The
issuer then bears the risk of loss between this date and the date that it
gives written notice to all of its affiliated merchants, hotels, etc. The risk
of loss then passes to the affiliated merchant if it should honor a credit
card after it has been notified that the card has been cancelled because
it was lost or stolen.
In the two-party credit card arrangement, the risk of loss shifting
process is abbreviated: the risk of loss is on the holder until he gives
written notice of the loss of the card, and, inasmuch as the issuer and
the honoring store are the same, there should be no loss falling on the
issuer.
In spite of the fact that there are approximately sixty million credit
cards in use in the United States today,7 there are only a handful of
reported cases involving suits by the issuers of credit cards against
the holders for charges incurred by unauthorized users. Legislative attention to the holder's liability for the unauthorized use of his credit card
has also been scanty. It has seemed to the author that this judicial and
legislative inaction could not be truly reflective of the magnitude of the
problem. As a result, the author prepared questionnaires which were sent
5. Dunne, Variation on a Theme by Parkinson or Some Proposals for the Uniform
Commercial Code and the Checkless Society, 75 YALE L.J. 788 (1966). See also Bergsten,
Credit Cards-A Prelude to the Cashless Society, 8 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 485 (1967)
which was published after the completion of this article.
6. The Miami Herald, Dec. 21, 1966, § C, at 11, col. 5; Crime and the Credit Card,
NAT'L. BETTER BusneEss BUREAU, SERVICE BULLETIN, Dec. 1966; Spotlight on Schemes,
NATIONAL BETTER BusiNEss BUREAU, SPECIAL NEWS REPORT, Oct., 1966.
7. Crime and the Credit Card, supra note 6. No one really knows how many credit cards
are in force. This survey covers companies which reported approximately 50,057,000 outstanding credit cards, and this figure is increasing daily because of the fantastic increase in
the number of issuers-particularly banks-and holders.
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to a more or less representative sampling of credit card issuing companies
in an attempt to ascertain financial data and business practices which
might account for the lack of litigation. The results of this empirical
investigation are discussed in a separate section of this article immediately
following the discussion of the reported cases, which will be grouped
into the two-party and the three-party credit arrangements because they
fall into these natural conceptual and chronological classifications.
II.

THE CREDIT CARD IN THE COURTS

A. The Two-Party Credit Arrangement
The ubiquitous plastic credit card of today apparently evolved out of
the metal charge coin or plate issued by department stores in the early
nineteen hundreds. These department store charge plates or coins usually
had the name and charge number of the customer imprinted on the
face of the coin, and they were effective only in the store of the issuer.
These plates or coins were designed to encourage sales by enabling the
customer to purchase on credit without the necessity of visiting the
credit department for each sale. From the wording of the few decisions
involving these coins, it would appear that these coins did not bear the
legend that the customer would be responsible for all purchases made on
the presentation of the coin until the store was advised that the coin had
been lost or stolen. It would also appear from these cases that the customer
did not sign any contract purporting to bind him for the amount of
all unauthorized purchases. As a result, the courts had to treat cases of
unauthorized use in somewhat of a factual-legal vacuum. In Wanamaker
v. Megary,8 the first reported case dealing with these charge coins, the
department store-issuer had issued a coin which merely contained the
name and credit number of the customer. The customer lost the token
along with other identification papers and the token was used by an unauthorized user. The court stated that "the coin is in effect an order upon
the plaintiff [department store] to deliver goods to the person presenting
it, and to charge the said goods to the defendant's account. It is similar
to a check, a bill of exchange or other negotiable instrument payable
to bearer."' Inasmuch as the coin or token did not contain any of the
usual words of negotiability, it is difficult to agree that the coin itself
should have been treated as if it were a negotiable instrument. However,
the court may have considered testimony (which it did not choose to
discuss in the opinion) that the customer had agreed to be bound for all
unauthorized purchases until she notified the store of the loss or theft of
the coin. Any agreement of this nature would not convert a non-negotiable
"instrument" into a negotiable one, but if the customer does agree to
be bound for all unauthorized purchases the legal effect of the agreement
8. 24 Pa. Dist. 778 (Phil. Mun. Ct. 1915).
9. Id. at 779.
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would be to protect the issuer of the card in the same way that a drawee
of a check would be protected if the customer should draw her check
payable to cash (or indorsed it in blank as payee) and it was presented
for payment by a thief or finder.' °
Lit Brothers v. Haines" involved the unauthorized use of a credit
coin similar in wording to the one involved in the Wanamaker case;
however, the parties stipulated that the "defendant [customer] was ignorant of the fact that any one producing her coin at plaintiff's store and
giving her correct name and address could obtain goods. ... 2"1 The
court held therefore that this admission negatived any inference of a
contract between the parties that the customer was to be responsible for
any unauthorized purchases, and that the coin could not be considered
negotiable because it lacked the requisite wording of negotiability. The
court was careful to note that "the coin was for the purpose of identification, and in the absence of any proof of an agreement between the parties
that it was to have any other effect it is limited to that purpose ....

;13

Although the court rejected the reasoning of the Wanamaker case as to
the negotiability of these coins or tokens, it is submitted that the court
might have followed the Wanamaker rationale if the customer had contracted with the department store issuer to assume responsibility for
unauthorized purchases.
In Jones Store Co. v. Kelly 4 the court, after stating that it was the
"custom"' 5 of the department store issuer to sell goods to the person
producing a charge coin, held that "if another wrongfully and without
his [the customer's] knowledge gained possession of and used the coin in
making purchases, then defendant is not liable."' 6 It would appear that
the court might have upheld the validity of an agreement by the customer
to pay for all unauthorized charges if the store had proven its existence;
however, the seemingly unilateral "custom" of the store to sell goods to
whomever presented the coin would not satisfy this burden.
10. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-202, 3-204.

11. 98 N.J.L. 658, 121 A. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
12. Id. at 659, 121 A. at 131.
13. Id. at 660, 121 A. at 132. This same theory is advanced in the more recent case of
Thomas v. Central Charge Serv., Inc., 212 A.2d 533 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965), noted in 23 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 125 (1965). Central Charge Service issued charge plates to Thomas and his
wife. Central Charge received accounts receivable from retail stores growing out of purchases
at these stores by holders of its charge plates. Unauthorized purchases were made on the husband's charge plate. Thomas did not sign the plate (as was required) and made only one purchase with it prior to the unauthorized purchases. Thomas did not notify Central Charge that
his charge plate was missing. The contract between the Thomases and Central Charge did not
provide that the holders were to be liable for all purchases made on the strength of the charge
plates. The court, therefore, held that the Thomases were not liable on any kind of a contractual basis, and that there was no implied promise by them to pay for unauthorized purchases because of the relationship of the parties. The court also refused to apply the rule that
as between two innocent partiks the one who made the loss possible should bear it.
14. 225 Mo. App. 833, 36 S.W.2d 681 (1931).
15. Id. at 835, 36 S.W.2d at 683.
16. Id. at 836, 36 S.W.2d at 683.
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Judicial hostility to department store credit cards or plates was
again manifested in the very recent case of Allied Stores, Inc. v. Funderburke.17 A customer applied for and received a credit plate under a
flexible charge account. The application stated that the holder agreed:
To pay for all purchases made by any person presenting the
identification plate which Seller will lend me, until Seller receives my
notice by certified mail that same has been lost or
8
stolen.'
The court noted that this wording was in accordance with a New York
statute which provides:
A provision to impose liability on an obligor .

.

. for use of a

credit card after its loss or theft is effective only if it is conspicuously written or printed in a size at least equal to eight
point bold type either on a card or on a writing accompanying
the card when issued or on the obligor's application for the card,
and then only until written notice of the loss or theft is given to
the issuer."
The holder left the City of New York for approximately one month,
and during her absence someone made 237 purchases using her credit
plate. Two hundred thirty purchases were for less than $15, while the
remaining seven purchases were for more than this amount. Total purchases amounted to $2,460. The store rules provided that for credit
purchases of more than $15, the clerk was to make inquiry of the credit
department; seemingly this rule was not obeyed.
The court first held that both the contractual provision and the
statute were ambiguous in that neither one expressly provided that the
holder assumes all risk occasioned by loss or theft "where the credit card
holder is unaware of such facts [loss or theft] and thus is unable to give
the required notice."2 6 The court then said that the case must be decided upon common law tort concepts rather than contractual or statutory
liability. The court noted that 237 charge slips were allowed to accumulate in a thirty-day period, and under the data-processing system in use
in the issuer's store if the sales slips totaled more than $200, a
"spill/out"' was to occur. It would appear that this "spill/out" did occur,
but only after $2,460 worth of purchases had been made. The store
asserted that it took time to collect all of the charge slips and that it was
unable to do so before all of these purchases were made. The court
17. 277 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. City 1967).
18. Id. at 10.
19. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 512 (McKinney 1962). See Macaulay, Private Legislation and
the Duty to Read-Business Run by IBM Machines, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards,
19 VAND. L. REv. 1051 (1966) for a brilliant analysis of the lack of warning given by issuers
of credit cards.
20. Allied Stores of N.Y., Inc. v. Funderburke, 277 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. City 1967).
21. Id. at 14.
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refuted this argument by stating that the issuer could not shift the burden
of its inadequacies or failures to the innocent consumer-holder. While
there was a duty on the part of the holder to exercise reasonable care over
the card, there was also a concurrent obligation on the part of the issuer
to protect its customer from the imposition of unjust charges and the
issuer failed to meet that obligation.
The major holding in this case that the holder is not liable under
the contractual and statutory provisions unless he is aware that his card
has been stolen or lost is a troublesome one in that it seems to encourage
perjury. If a holder admits that he knew his card was lost or stolen and
he has failed to notify the issuer, liability will follow. On the other hand,
if he denies that he had this knowledge, he will stand a good chance of
escaping from any liability unless the issuer can prove that it is free
from fault. It does not require the gift of clairvoyance to predict what
future holders will assert in their defense. It is a matter of some conjecture
whether this court would have held in favor of the defendant if the
contractual clause had stated clearly that the holder was to be liable for
the improper use of this plate whether or not she had knowledge that
it had been lost or stolen. This decision has virtually nullified the effectiveness of the New York statutes in bipartite situations. Inasmuch as the
court was careful to limit the holding of this case to its bipartite factual
setting, its impact may be rather limited. But, regardless of the bipartite
or tripartite nature of the credit plate arrangement, it is difficult to agree
with the court's rather strained interpretation of the wording on the
credit application-an interpretation that was not drawn by the Municipal
Court of City of New York on similar wording of a contract and the
same statute in the case of Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein,2" which is discussed
in the next section of this article.
B. The Three-Party Credit Card Arrangement
The two-party department store credit plate cases of the first onethird of this century were succeeded by the three-party oil company
credit cards cases.
In Gulf Refining Company v. Plotnick2" the oil company issued its
"charge-a-plate" to a customer who kept it in his automobile. The
automobile was stolen, and the thief used the plate in making purchases
at service stations owned by the oil company and at other authorized
independent dealers. The holder of the card was billed for the unauthorized
purchases, but failed to notify the oil company of the theft for a period of
approximately four months. The trial court instructed the jury to confine its deliberations to the sales made at the oil company's own stations
and eliminated those purchases made at other authorized stations. The
22. 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1962).
23. 24 Pa. D & C 147 (C.P. Lancaster County 1934).
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court failed to mention if the customer had agreed expressly to pay for
unauthorized purchases, and stated that ordinarily the holder should not
be held liable for a debt created by a thief or one not authorized to obtain
credit by using the card. However, the court held in favor of the oil
company on the particular facts and circumstances of the case. The
court apparently based its decision on the fact that the customer had been
careless in the custody of his card and negligent in failing to report its
loss, although this reasoning was not clearly articulated.
The first case clearly involving an express promise by a credit card
holder to pay for all purchases made through use of his card was Magnolia
PetroleumCo. v. McMillan.2 4 The card provided that:
The named holder shall be responsible for all purchases made by
use of this card, prior to its surrender to the issuing company,
whether or not such purchases are made by the named holder
or into the car described .... This card is not transferable ....

5

The holder lent the card to two men who made some purchases for the
benefit of the holder, but one of these men made additional unauthorized
purchases for his own benefit and the holder refused to pay for these
latter charges. The court held in favor of the petroleum company by
upholding the validity of the contractual provision. It is interesting to
note that the court made no attempt to reconcile the provision that the
card was not transferable with the fact that it was holding the holder
liable for the purchases of the borrower of the card who might be
broadly described as a transferee. The case can be justified on the fact
that the holder made the loss possible by his lending the card and then
failing to notify the oil company that the borrower had failed to return
it to the holder and was continuing to use it. On the other hand, the contractual clause required the surrender of the card, and it would be interesting to speculate what the court would have held if the holder had
notified the oil company to cancel the card and had advised it that he
was unable to return the card because of the refusal of the borrower to
return it.
A modified version of the contractual provision in the Magnolia
case appears in Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams Roofing Co. 26 wherein the

holder assumed "full responsibility for all merchandise, deliveries or
service obtained on credit by any person by its presentation. '27 The
defendant-holder received eight cards bearing the provision. The holder
had the words "Good for Truck Only ' 21 typed on the face of each card
and then distributed them to its truck drivers for use in the course of their
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

168 S.W.2d 881 (Civ. App. Tex. 1943).
Id.
208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790 (1945).
Id. at 364, 186 S.W.2d at 792.
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employment. One driver used his card at a Gulf authorized station;
the gas station employee failed to return the card and used it in purchasing goods and cashing checks in a number of gas stations. There was
definite evidence of collusion between the unauthorized user of this card
and the employees in many of the gas stations, and the holder refused to
pay Gulf. The court held that the holder had the right to type the words
"Good for Truck Only" upon the face of the card and that each gas
station that extended credit on the strength of this card did so subject
to the limitation. The court then held that the holder's agreement to
"assume full responsibility" was in fact a guaranty of payment to anyone
extending credit in good faith upon the strength of the card and upon
the limitation placed there by the holder, and that the holder-guarantor
cannot be held liable beyond the strict terms of his contract. As dicta,
the court stated that the forged invoices representing purchases by the
unauthorized user were assigned to Gulf which could not claim any
greater rights in the assigned charges than were held by the assignor-gas
stations. If the gas-stations could not recover against the holder, then
neither could Gulf. It is submitted that if the holder had not typed the
restrictive limitation upon the cards, the court would have come to the
same conclusion based upon this assignment theory.
The assignment and guaranty theories of Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams Roofing Company were used in Union Oil Co. v. Lull.2 9 In Union
the credit card bore the unfortunate language that "the customer to whom
this card is issued guarantees payment ...

of price of products delivered

or services rendered to anyone presenting this card, guarantee to continue
until card is surrendered or written notice is received by the company
that it is lost or stolen."" ° The card was lost or stolen, and an unauthorized
person used it while driving a stolen automobile. The holder's card gave
his residence as being in Oregon, while the unauthorized user was driving
an automobile with Idaho license plates. Most of the impostor's charge
slips recorded the Idaho license number, and the court stated that the
disparity between the Oregon residence on the card and the Idaho license
plates should have prompted the service station attendants to make
inquiry relative to the identification of the unauthorized user and that
this might have prevented the unauthorized sales. The court then held
that the issuer's rights "cannot transcend those of the dealer,"'" and the
issuer's right to recover under the guaranty agreement is "conditioned
upon the exercise of reasonable care in making inquiry concerning the
identity of the impostor using the card."8 2 The court was careful to note
that if the unauthorized user had possessed identification showing that
he was the true holder of the card and that this evidence was sufficient to
29.
30.
31.
32.

220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960).
Id. at 416, 349 P.2d at 245.
Id. at 436, 349 P.2d at 254.
Id.
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convince a reasonable man to conclude that the impostor was the true
holder, the holder would be liable for the purchases made by the impostor.
It would seem that Union adopted the guaranty-indemnity theory of Gull
Refining.
The guaranty agreement found present in the Union Oil case was
distinguished in Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein3 wherein the credit card provided that:
Such person, corporation or firm [the holder] assumes full
responsibility for all purchases made hereunder by any one
through the use of this credit card prior to surrendering it to the
company or to giving the company notice in writing that the card
has been lost or stolen.34
The court noted that the above language constituted an "original undertaking in which the defendant [the holder] made it his own responsibility
for any use of the card, ' 35 while the contract in the Union Oil case
created a suretyship contract between the parties making the holder a
gratuitous indemnitor. The court, after reviewing the business background surrounding the use of credit cards in the oil industry, refused to
place any burden of care upon the issuer, but placed the entire duty of
care in the custody of the card on the holder. This holding is a flat rejection of any assertion that the retail gas stations have any duty of due
care as articulated in the Union Oil Co. case.
It is submitted that the court ignored one vital aspect of the credit
card which was seemingly not involved in any other of the prior cases:
the card bore the signature of the holder and this was designed to
furnish an additional means of identification. Although it was not stated
in the case, it would appear that credit card holders were required ,to
sign their charge slips when making purchases at gasoline stations and
a simple comparison of the signature on the credit card with the signature
on the charge slips should have been sufficient to indicate that the
presenter of the card was an impostor, unless he happened to be an
expert forger. If gas stations do not have any responsibility to compare
these signatures, then this means of identification has been denied any
practical efficacy.
It is also submitted that the court was misled by the fact that Texaco
Company purchased the charge slips from the gas stations "at par"
without profit to itself and that the gas stations are, for the most part,
independent dealers. The fact that Texaco did not make a profit on each
charge sale by purchasing the charge slip at a discount should be an
irrelevant factor because Texaco did make a profit on the sale of its
33. 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1962), noted in 12 DE PAUL L. REV. 150 (1962).
34. Id. at 53.
35. Id. at 54.
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products and these sales are supposedly increased by the use of the
credit cards-the court ignored the totality of the economic arrangement.
Secondly, Texaco can and does regulate the use of credit cards by its
dealers even though they are classified as "independent contractors."
Finally, it is submitted that the court placed too much reliance on
a recent statutory enactment in New York which has been previously
discussed:
A provision to impose liability on a obligor for the purchase or
lease of property or services by use of a credit card after its loss
or theft is effective only if it is conspicuously written or printed
in a size at least equal to eight point bold type either on the
card, or on a writing accompanying the card when issued or on
the obligor's application for the card. 6
The court stated that the "Legislature acknowledged the validity of
the agreement between the parties

. . .""

by this enactment. The fact that

the legislature has validated these provisions (if printed in eight point
type) does not also imply that the legislature has destroyed any defenses
which the holder may have arising out of acts in the credit-sale process
which are aliunde the original provision. To take an extreme example, if
the issuer of the credit card should conspire with retail merchants to charge
the holder for fictitious sales, the holder could admit the validity of the
original contract and defeat recovery by raising the affirmative defense of
fraud. In a more realistic vein, compliance with this statute should not
result in the holder's being denied the right to assert defenses arising out
of the misconduct of retail merchants who have honored his card in the
hands of an impostor.
The only known Florida articulation governing the responsibility of
the holder for the unauthorized use of his credit card is the unreported
case of Shell Oil Co. v. Krusen,5 which was an appeal from the Civil
Claims Court to the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County. The holder
received a card which provided that "If a customer fails to promptly
notify Shell in writing of the loss or theft of this card it shall be conclusively presumed its use by the bearer is with the customer's permission."8 9
The card was stolen from the holder's boat "although apprised of the theft
within a few days of its occurrence, he was not conscious of the disappearance of the card until notified . . .by the law enforcement authorities
of ...Arkansas, that they had taken it from the thief."4 ° The holder then

advised Shell of the theft and the recovery of the card by the police in
Arkansas.
36. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 512 (McKinney 1962).
37. Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51, 56 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1962).
38. Appeal No. 26479-L (1951). It may be of interest to note that the circuit court of
appeal consisted of three judges.
39. Id. at page 3 of the opinion.
40. Id. at 2.
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The card provided a space for the signature of the holder, but he
failed to sign it. The court held that the provisions of the contract on the
card did not expressly or impliedly require the holder's signature to validate its use, and his retention of it for more than thirty days prior to the
theft with the intention of using it was an acceptance of it and he was
bound in the absence of a requirement that his signature was necessary
to validate its use.
The court expressly upheld the condition requiring the holder to give
prompt notice to the issuer of the fact of loss or theft: "in this case if
such notice had been promptly furnished, the thief's fraudulent use of
the card could have been foiled."'"
As an additional ground for its holding, the court stated:
For like reasons, we think the term 'it shall be conclusively presumed its use by the bearer is with the customer's permission' in
the event of the failure to notify the company is reasonable and
enforceable. Consequently, we hold the defendant is bound by
such terms and conditions and must be held liable for the merchandise secured by the thief under the circumstances reflected
in this record. His inadvertence cannot absolve him.42
It seems implicit that if the holder had promptly notified Shell of the theft
of his card, the court would not have imposed liability upon him. This
implicit holding would seem to be supported by the very recent case of
Read v. Gulf Oil Corp.,43 a case of first impression in Georgia. The holder
of a Gulf Oil card had aplied for and used it. The card was lost or stolen
and an imposter used it. The card provided that "Acceptance by the party
named on the front [the holder] implies responsibility for all service and
merchandise obtained thereby. Loss or theft hereof must be reported in
writing immediately to avoid responsibility for unauthorized use."'44 The
holder notified Gulf in writing of the fact of loss, and all purchases by the
imposter were made subsequent to this written notice. The appellate court
first held that the issuance of a credit card operates as a mere offer on the
part of the issuer, and when the holder accepts it by retaining and using
it, a contract is formed. The court held finally that it was the duty of the
trial court to direct a verdict in favor of the holder when her uncontradicted testimony showed that she gave written notice to the issuer prior
to the date of the purchases made by the imposter.
The muddied juridical credit card picture has been further muddled
by the equivocal, unreported California case of The Diners' Club, Inc. v.
Whited.4" The cardholder applied for and received a card which stated
41. Id. at 4.
42. Id.
43. 114 Ga. App. 21, 150 S.E.2d 319 (1966).
44. Id. at 23, 150 S.E.2d at 320.
45. Civil No. 10872, App. Dep't. Cal., Aug. 6, 1964, Trial Ct. No. 32274, noted in 43
N.C.L. REV. 416 (1965) and 67 W. VA. L. REV. 145 (1965).
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that "If this Credit Card is lost or stolen, original holder is liable and
responsible for all purchases charged through use of this card until . . .
written notice of its loss or theft."46 In addition to this statement on the
card, the Listings Directory, which was incorporated by reference by a
statement on the back of the card, stated that "The Credit Card is not
transferable and will be honored only when properly signed and presented
by the authorized holder."47 An unknown imposter obtained possession
of this card and incurred charges of $1,622.99 before written notice was
received by the issuer. The Diners' Club paid these charges to various
restaurants pursuant to contracts which provided that "We [the issuer]
undertake to purchase, and you [the merchant] undertake to sell, all valid
charges of the amount of the check. The obligation to collect from the
CLUB member from that point on will be upon us." 48 Most of these contracts also provided that "The CLUB card must bear the signature of
the person whose name is embossed on the face of the card. The signature
of the cardholder signed on our charge forms ...

or on your bill or check

must be the same as that appearing on the face of the card."4 9 The Diners'
Club brought suit against the cardholder upon his refusal to pay these
charges incurred by the imposter; the trial court ruled in favor of The
Diners' Club and the appellate court reversed.
The court cited the Gulf Refining Co."° and Union Oil Co. 51 cases
with approbation for the proposition that a cardholder is not absolutely
liable, but that the issuer and the merchant each owe a duty of reasonable
care so that irregular charges are not unnecessarily incurred. The court
then stated -that the contracts between The Diners' Club and the respective merchants provided for assignments of the credit card holder's
charges to The Diners' Club, and that under the assignment theory of the
Gulf and Union cases "any negligence of the merchants would be chargeable to The Diners' Club." 2 The court then found that the issuer had not
shown that it and its merchants were free from negligence; in fact there
was no showing that any of the merchants required the impostor to
identify himself at any time.
Despite all of these statements as to the negligence of the merchants and the rule governing the assignments of accounts receivable, the
court chose to base its order of reversal on the basis that The Diners' Club
had not proved the "damage issue.""8 The court noted that the two different forms of contracts in existence between The Diners' Club and the
various merchants did not have the same wording. In all of the contracts,
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790 (1945).
220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960).
Supra note 45, at 2.
Id. at 3.
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The Diners' Club agreed to purchase only "valid" charges. In addition,
most of the contracts provided that the account must contain the "signature" of the cardholder and it must be "the same" as that on the card.
The court then seemingly held that the payments which The Diners' Club
made on these forged accounts were made on a "voluntary" 4 basis and
therefore they would not constitute items of legal damage. As dicta, the
court noted that it would be possible for The Diners' Club to bind itself
with its merchants to purchase accounts made by forgery if due care were
exercised by the merchant and to pass on these charges to the cardholder,
but that these contracts did not impose this liability between Diners' and
its merchants. In addition to this judicial suggestion to The Diners' Club
as to how to escape the "damage" issue question by redrafting its contracts with its merchants, the court also offered another escape-hatch suggestion as a means of circumventing the forgery question by redrafting
the Diners' contract with its cardholders and also by eliminating the signature on the card and by not restricting the use of the card to the issueeholder in accordance with the practice in the oil company contracts. One
difficulty with this case remains: assuming that Diners' contracts were redrafted in accordance with the court's suggestions, would Diners' still have
to prove that its merchants used due care in identifying the possessor of
a credit card as the legal holder of it in order to enforce liability on a
holder for the use of his card by an impostor? The opinion is not entirely
clear on this point.
III.

EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

The results of any empirical investigation are subject to question
because of numerous variables which may be encompassed under the
ability of the interviewer and the knowledgeable candor of the interviewee. The ability of this interviewer may be judged by the quality of
the questions in the questionnaire. An evaluation of the answers to the
questionnaire indicating the knowledgeable candor of the interviewees
becomes more difficult. With only minor exceptions, it is submitted that
the answers given to the questionnaire were fully candid in the sense that
there did not seem to be any intentional concealment or flavoring of the
answers. However, it is impossible to know the degree, if any, of the subconscious slanting of the answers. For example, a credit manager's answers to the author's questions might be affected by the fact that he
would hate to admit (even in the anonymity of a questionnaire) that there
was a high rate of incidence of use of credit cards by impostors or that the
monetary loss rate had reached alarming proportions. It is interesting to
note, in response to this suggestion, that the incidence of the improper
use of credit cards and the monetary loss from this improper use were
surprisingly uniform among issuers of the same class, i.e., there was little
54. Id. at 4.
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variation among various oil company issuers or among department store
issuers, etc. In fact, the questionnaire disclosed that there was a surprisingly high rate of uniformity in the incidence of loss between issuers of
different classes.
On a more objective level, the answers of many interviewees seemed
to indicate either that data processing was not being used or that it was
being used improperly because phrases such as "estimated," "approximate," or "we believe" were used when answering the questions dealing
with the number of cards lost during an average year, or the percentage
of lost cards improperly used during the year or the average monetary
amount of purchases made by the average improper user. It seems incomprehensible to the author that any large credit card issuer can survive
today without having statistics immediately available. For example, how
can an issuer decide on a massive drive to induce the public to become
credit card holders without knowing what its incidence of loss has been
on bad debts, improper use, etc.? How can the issuer make the decision
whether or not to sue its holders for improper use of lost or stolen cards
without knowing the loss rate and the improper use rate? 55
The reader may have additional objections to the validity of the
author's attempt to ascertain what credit card issuers are doing about the
improper use of credit cards, but, for what it is worth, the remainder of
this article will attempt to throw some light on a business activity which
has been lightly touched upon by the courts.
The author promised each of the subject companies that this article
would not disclose in identifiable form the answers given to the author.
Hence, this article has grouped the various issuers under the "two-party
credit card arrangement" (the department stores), and the "three-party
credit card arrangement" (which is further divided into the oil company
issuers and the independent issuers such as American Express, The Diner's
Club, Carte Blanche, etc.). Of course, these groupings are not entirely
accurate because, for example, many of the oil company credit cards may
be used at hotels and motels; some of the airline credit cards may also be
used at hotels and motels, etc. In effect the original two-party card may
also be used in a three-party transaction. The lines of demarcation are
constantly being blurred by the ingenuity of the issuers; however, a grouping by "industry" was necessary in order to arrive at some workable
method of presenting the statistics.
A.

Two-Party Credit Card Arrangements
1.

THE DEPARTMENT STORE

Four department stores, Burdines of Miami, Jordan Marsh of Florida (covering the South Florida Area mainly), Richards Department
55. Data processing is being used in an increasing degree by credit exchanges, see The
Miami Rev. and Daily Record, Vol. 41, No. 69, Sept. 14, 1966, at 1, col. 1.
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Store of Miami, and Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Southern Territory) answered the author's questionnaires. These companies reported a total in
excess of 8,340,000 outstanding credit or charge cards. With reference
to the number of outstanding cards, one company reported a high of
7,500,000 while the low was slightly in excess of 200,000.
Only two of the four companies reported the amount of average
annual charges incurred by the average credit card holder: the high was
$240 while the low was $160.
Three of the four companies reported the percentage of lost or stolen
credit cards during the average year. The company with the least number
of outstanding credit cards reported that "15 to 25 per week" were reported lost or stolen; this amounts to a percentage of approximately .4
percent. The company with approximately 100,000 cards more than the
latter company reported a loss percentage of approximately .5, while the
company with the greatest number of outstanding credit cards reported
a loss percentage of 1 percent. Although the sampling may be too small
for accurate appraisal, it appears that the percentage of loss increases
with relationship to the number of cards issued. On the other hand, the
company with the lowest percentage of lost or stolen credit cards reported that approximately 10 percent of the lost or stolen cards are used
improperly, while the company with the highest percentage of lost or
stolen credit cards reported that only .5 percent of these cards are used
improperly. Somewhat surprisingly, the store which had 100,000 credit
cards more than the smallest (in a credit card sense) issuer, reported that
approximately 1 percent of its lost or stolen cards are used improperly.
If these three stores are representative, there would seem to be no correlation between the number of cards outstanding and the incidence of
improper use.
Only two stores supplied any information as to the approximate
amount of goods which were obtained by the average unauthorized user
of a lost or stolen card. The high figure reported was $275 while the low
was $150. It is interesting to note that these figures do not vary considerably from those reported by the oil industry, which are discussed in the
next section of this article.
Three of these department stores asserted that their holders were
liable for all charges made as the result of an unauthorized use of their
credit cards until written notice was received by the issuer, while one asserted the contrary. However, of the three stores asserting liability against
the holder, two stated that they had not instituted suit, while the third
stated that it instituted suit
only where we felt the account holder had knowledge of the
charges, and was responsible. Charges resulting from marital
problems or those incurred by unauthorized relatives or friends
fall into this category.
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Within the narrow area of this article, it appears that not one of
these four stores had instituted suit against a holder whose card had been
lost or stolen. It is interesting to note that the credit cards or charge plates
of these companies contain the signature of the holder. Two of the companies stated their policy regarding identification of holders. One company
stated:
We require charge plate holders to identify themselves on large
purchases, especially of luxury type merchandise .

. .

. Where

further identification is required, our clerks request a driver's
license, voter's registration card, employer identification card or
other form of identification showing the customer's name,
address and signature.
The second company stated that its identification procedures are
accomplished
by comparison of signatures on charge card and salescheck ....
If we have reasonable reason to believe the person presenting the
card is not the person whose account the card represents, we
could require such identification as driver's license, military ID
cards, other credits, etc.
It may be suggested that if a thief should steal the wallet of the
average man, he would have sufficient "identification" cards to "prove"
his identity to the average sales clerk. The answer to this problem rests
in the issuance of tamper-proof credit cards which bear the color photograph of the holder.
B. Three-Party Credit Card Arrangements
1.

THE OIL COMPANIES

Nine oil companies, Shell, Gulf, American, Phillips, Standard Oil of
Kentucky, Sinclair, Atlantic, Citgo and Pure Oil submitted answers to
the author's questionnaires. These nine companies listed a total of approximately 31,200,000 credit cards outstanding. The actual figure is considerably larger because one of the largest companies reported that the
number of its credit card holders was "classified information, but I
can tell you that we have in the hands of our customers in excess of one
million credit cards." These companies presented a rather dramatic difference in the number of cards outstanding for each company. Of those
eight companies reporting a specific figure, the high was 8,000,000 and
the low was 1,300,000. The mean (midpoint between the extremes) was
4,633,000, the median figure was 4,000,000, and the average was
3,775,000.
Although there was a vast disparity in the number of credit cards
outstanding among these oil companies, there was little difference as to
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the amount of the charges for goods and services incurred annually by
the average credit card holder regardless of which company card he held.
The average credit card holder for eight of the above companies charged
$271.87 annually. The mean amount of annual charges incurred by the
average holder of a card issued by eight of the above companies was
$245, and the median figure was $300. One company reported that its
average holder charged from $300 to $400 per year, while at the low end
of the spectrum one company reported $90 per year. The latter company
had 1,400,000 cards outstanding while the "high" company had 8,000,000
cards outstanding. If these two companies are considered in isolation, it
would appear that the greater the number of credit cards the greater the
amount of annual purchases per card. This appearance is deceiving. One
company with only 1,300,000 outstanding cards, 100,000 less than the
company reporting $90 per year, reported that its average holder charged
$300 per year-while a competitor which reported 7,000,000 cards outstanding also reported average annual charges of $300. There would seem
to be little, if any, correlation between the number of credit cards and the
amount of annual charges per card. Of course, the greater the number of
active credit card users the greater will be the gross income of the issuer.
All of the above oil companies reported the approximate percentage
of their credit cards which were reported lost or stolen during the average
year. The percentage rate of losses reported among the various companies
varied considerably. The highest percentage rate of losses reported was
3.4 percent while the low was .7 percent. The average percentage was
1.24, the mean was 2.05 and the median was 1.00. It is again impossible
to draw any correlations between the number of outstanding cards and
the percentage of losses reported. The company which reported the largest
number of outstanding credit cards reported a loss percentage of 2.00
while its next largest competitor (in a credit card sense) reported a loss
percentage of 3.4. One of the larger companies reported a loss percentage
of .33 while one of the smaller competitors reported a percentage of 1.00.
The most that can be said is that holders lose cards, or have them stolen,
without any relationship to the size of the company issuing them.
The empirical investigation becomes even more complex when one
attempts to present a percentage pattern of improper use of credit cards
by finders or thieves. In response to the question "approximately what
percentage of the lost (or stolen) credit or charge cards are improperly
used during the average year?", eight of the companies reported an average of 2.45 percent with a mean of 2.3 percent and a median of 2.7 percent. Two of the companies stated that approximately 5 percent of their
lost or stolen credit cards are used improperly while one company reported a low improper use rate of .4 percent. One of the largest as well
as one of the smallest (in a credit card sense) had 5 percent of their lost
or stolen cards used improperly. It would appear that the dishonest ele-
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ment of our population is nondiscriminatory. In order to breathe life into
these somewhat sterile percentage amounts, the following table portrays
the number of outstanding credit cards for each company, the percentage
of lost or stolen credit cards improperly used and the average dollar
amount obtained as a result of the improper use:

Company

No. of
Credit
Cards

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I

7,000,000
4,000,000
8,000,000
3,000,000
1,000,000 (plus)
4,000,000
1,300,000
1,500,000 (plus)
1,400,000

Percentage
Lost Each
Year
3.4
1.0
2.0
1.3
.33
1.0
1.00 (t)
.5
.7

Percentage
of Lost Cards
Used Improperly

Monetary
Amounts

1.7
.4
2.3
3.75
5.00
.5
5.00 (or less)
N/A
1.00 (or less)

$ 95.00
200.00-250.00
161.00
141.00
214.00
75.00
150.00
N/A
125.00

This table indicates that the average unauthorized user incurs charges
amounting to $151.37 when he uses a lost or stolen credit card; the mean
figure is $150 and the median is $162.50. If one should take Company
"C" as an example, it would appear that approximately 3,680 of its cards
are used each year by unauthorized users who obtain merchandise and
services worth $592,480 which must be borne by the issuer, the holders
and the service stations in varying amounts.
Eight of the above oil companies answered "yes" to the question
"Are the holders of your credit or charge cards liable for all amounts obtained as the result of an unauthorized use of your card until written
notice is received by your office?" The ninth oil company was more
realistic when it answered "Theoretically, yes." One of the eight companies qualified its answer by stating "By the terms of the credit card,
yes. However, for practical business reasons, we do not as a matter of
good customer relations enforce it." Of the seven oil companies which
gave a categorical "yes" to the notion of the holder's liability, three stated
(in the succeeding question) that they have not attempted to enforce the
alleged liability by bringing suit. Hence, out of nine oil companies only
four have a policy of bringing suit against a holder for charges incurred
by an unauthorized user after the loss or theft of a card. It may be interesting to note that the companies which have relatively fewer outstanding
credit cards display a much more benevolent attitude towards their credit
card holders than their larger (in a credit card sense) competitors.
In response to question "7b" of the questionnaire, only two answers
were received as to the average amount sued for in an action by the issuer
against the holder: one company reported $466 as the average amount
while the other reported $300. Of the four companies which had instituted suit against holders, only one claimed that it had been successful
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in all cases in the trial and the appellate courts and this statement was
supported by one citation to an unreported case. One company which
answered "no" to the question presented in 7C added the following
observation:
We wish to point out that most of the adverse rulings have been
due to lack of sufficient proof, due to difficulties of getting witnesses before the court and other reasons. However, there are
one or two isolated cases which attempt, as a matter of law,
to completely immunize the credit card holder-usually a person
of moderate means who is confronted with a sizable indebtedness
from which he reaped no benefit-even where he has failed to
give timely notice of loss or where he has entrusted the card
to another person who refuses to return it. The rationale of
these cases is that.. . [the issuer] is or should be a quasi-insurer,
since ...

[the issuer] is in position to set up a reserve fund to

cover this type of loss.
In response to the author's inquiry as to what percentage of holders
have paid voluntarily and what percentage did so after suit was filed for
charges incurred from an unauthoried use of the card, only two companies attempted an answer. One company reported that approximately
30 percent of its holders made payment for unauthorized charges without
suit being filed, while the other company said that 2 percent of its holders
paid without suit being filed and less than 1 percent did so after suit was
filed.
One company reported on a facet of the unauthorized user problem
which, although outside of the scope of this article, seemingly was of
more importance to the company's attorney than the "simple" case of a
thief or finder using a credit card:
Even as to subsequent charges [charges made after notice of
loss of the card is given by the holder to the issuer], suit against
the holder may be brought in those instances where the user contends that he is not an unauthorized user but was given the card
by the holder. This type of situation arises most frequently as
between estranged husbands and wives, parents and children,
and employers and employees. Some users have contended that
they have given cards to pay off gambling debts, and . . . [the
issuer] recently lost a case . . . where the court accepted testi-

mony of a reputed prostitute that she was given the card in
question.
In these disputed situations .

..

[the issuer] tries to bring

both parties before the court, so that they can resolve their conflicting positions between themselves, with the court imposing
liability upon the responsible party. This is not always possible,
however, because the parties may be in different jurisdictions
where they are not amenable to comment process. In such latter
cases ...

[the issuer] must elect which of the two parties to sue.
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2.

THE AIRLINES

At first blush, the legal and business arrangement between an airline issuer of a credit card and its holder would appear to be a two-party
arrangement, and in many common transactions it will be just thatthe holder purchases a ticket from the issuing airline by presenting his
credit card. However, over 120 airlines operate under The Universal Air
Travel Plan whereby 48 "contractor" airlines issue credit cards which
will be honored by all 120 carriers. In addition, travel agents will often
issue airline tickets through the use of an airline credit card. Finally, airline credit cards may also be used to rent automobiles from car rental
agencies, etc. The "contractor" airline which issued the credit card
collects from the individual cardholder or from a "subscriber"-corporations or business firms which have instructed the "contractor" to issue
cards to designated officers and employees of the "subscriber." The
"contractor" is ordinarily liable to the ticket-issuing airline for the value
of the ticket, but this liability may be shifted to the ticket-issuing airline
in certain instances, e.g.,: the ticket-issuing airline honors a card after
receipt of notice that the card has been reported lost or stolen or fails to
use reasonable care to prevent unauthorized use of the card by accepting
a "Transportation Receipt" (invoice form signed by the recipient of the
ticket) with no signature or with a signature obviously unlike the one
of the cardholder. In short, the two-party airline credit card arrangement may commonly slip into a three-party arrangement.
The airline credit card presents unique opportunities for the thief
or finder to obtain large amounts of cash. In most credit card situations
the finder or thief is limited to purchasing goods and services of relatively
small monetary value-he has to make repeated purchases within a
relatively short period of time in order to make his wrongdoing worthwhile. The thief or finder of an airline credit card is not so handicapped;
he merely has to purchase a large number of expensive airline tickets at
travel agencies and at airline counters and then cash them at another
counter of the same airline. A skilled operator may obtain many thousands
of dollars within a matter of a few days or even hours by this process.
The circulation of a list of stolen or lost credit cards by the airlines to
their offices cannot effectively stop this operation because of the speedy
work by the criminal element. It has been estimated that over one billion
dollars worth of tickets a year are charged by use of credit cards, hence
the opportunity for illicit gain is tremendous.
There is one obvious way in which the airlines may reduce, if not
eliminate, the purchase and cashing of airplane tickets by unauthorized
users of credit cards: all airline tickets purchased with credit cards should
have a statement stamped on them by the issuing agent to the effect that
"this ticket was purchased under XYZ Credit Card Number 723597."
All ticketing agents would then be instructed that all tickets bearing
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this legend could not be cashed, but that holders would be permitted to
exchange them for other tickets (also bearing this legend) or exchanged
for a credit memo which would be sent to the issuer of the credit card.
A similar system has been inaugurated by at least some of the airlines.
Four airlines, Delta, Eastern, National and United, answered the
author's questionnaires. These four companies listed a total of 485,000
outstanding credit cards. There was a phenomenal difference in the
respective company's issuance of these cards, with the low being only
4,000 and the high being 300,000. The mean and median were 160,000
and the average was 121,250; however, with the sampling being limited
to four companies with such a disparate rate of issuance, it is doubtful if
the average, mean and median figures have any real significance.
In the oil industry there was little difference as to the amount of
charges incurred by the average credit card holder; this correlation was
not found in the airline industry. One company reported that the average
user incurred charges of $5,800 per year per card. One of its competitors
reported a low of $350 and the average was $1,903.12, while both the
mean and the median were $900. Again the limited sampling may enervate
any meaning from these figures. It is interesting to note, however, that
the company issuing only 4,000 credit cards reported that the holders
incurred charges of $5,800 per card while a competitor with over 300,000
cards outstanding reported an annual average use of $900 per card. On
the other hand, a company which reported 160,000 outstanding cards
reported annual charges of $562.50-a total of $90,000,000 a year of
annual billing to credit card holders. This is big business indeed.
It is difficult to group the airlines as to their reported percentage of
lost or stolen cards during the average year. The airline which had only
4,000 credit cards issued reported that 10 percent of these cards are
reported lost or stolen each year, while the airline with 300,000 cards
reported a loss or theft ratio of approximately .83 percent, and its
nearest competitor-with 160,000 cards-reported a ratio of .20 percent.
On the other hand, one airline which has only 21,000 cards reported a
percentage of only .5 percent. With three airlines reporting a loss or
theft ratio of under 1 percent and one reporting a ratio of 10 percent,
it would appear that the latter airline ought to reexamine its policies regarding issuance of these cards.
Only three of the four airlines submitted information as to what
percentage of the lost or stolen credit cards are used unlawfully each
year. If these three airlines are any indication, the incidence of improper
use of these cards is much lower in the airline industry than in the oil
industry. The three companies reported respective improper use ratios
of .78 percent, 1 percent and 2 percent. The fourth airline reported that
it had made "no count."
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The four airlines in answering the question dealing with the approximate amount of goods and services obtained by the average unauthorized
user of each lost or stolen credit card, failed to arrive at any real averages.
One airline said that the amount "varies considerably, but "loss in 1966
will be approximately $50,000." Another said, "In the last year we had
two cards, one for $113,000 and one for $1,200." A third airline reported
an average of $27,000, but then qualified it by stating "The $27,000
figure is the average amount of air transportation purchased by unauthorized users. Four cards were used by unauthorized persons for the purchase of air transportation tickets amounting to $108,000 in the year
ended

. .

.1966." The most that can be said concerning these figures is

that four airlines will have suffered an initial loss of $172,200 as the
result of the unauthorized use of their respective credit cards, and it
is probable that the total figure will be much greater.
All four airlines asserted that their respective holders were liable
for unauthorized charges made on the strength of their credit cards;
however, three of them stated that they had not sued their holders, while
the fourth declined to furnish any information regarding this point.
One airline reported that approximately 50 percent of its card holders
voluntarily paid for unauthorized charges without any suit being filed.
The other three airlines might be advised to use the same tactic in
recouping part of their losses.
3.

THE INDEPENDENT ISSUERS

Four independent issuers, American Express Company, General Electric Credit Corp., Carte Blanche Corp., and The Diners' Club answered in
varying degrees of completeness, the author's questionnaire. Playboy
Clubs International, Inc., has been grouped with the independent issuers,
even though its cards are usually honored for credit only in establishments
which are franchisees or wholly owned subsidiaries of Playboy Clubs
International, Inc., because its arrangement is difficult to equate with
any other grouping and because it is believed that holders of the Playboy
credit cards might be inclined to have one or more of the cards issued
by other independent issuers in this group.
These five companies reported a total of 4,312,000 cards outstanding;
the actual figure is probably greater than this because one of the larger
companies listed the word "plus" after its submitted figure. Of these
companies reporting a more or less specific figure, the high was 1,800,000
and the low was 12,000; the mean was approximately 894,000 and the
median was 500,000. Because of the vast difference between the high
and the low figures, it would appear that the mean figure would have
little statistical validity.
Only two companies reported the annual charges for goods or services
incurred by the average credit card holder; one company reported in
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excess of $200 per year and the other stated it was approximately $12
a year.
Four companies reported on the percentage of cards which are reported lost or stolen each year. One company reported the rather appalling
fact that 12 percent of its cards are reported lost or stolen, while another
reported a low figure of .019 percent. Another company said that from
1 to 5 of its cards were reported lost or stolen each week, and the remaining company reported its loss rate at .05 percent.
Despite the rather wide divergence among these companies as to the
annual percentage of credit cards reported lost or stolen, there seemed
to be a rather close correlation in the percentage of lost or stolen credit
cards which were improperly used by finders or thieves. Three companies
furnished percentage figures which were respectively: less than 1 percent,
.05 percent and .025 percent. The fourth company reported that only two
of its lost or stolen cards had been improperly used during the last
fifteen years.
Three of these five companies reported the amount of goods and
services obtained by the average unauthorized user of each lost or stolen
credit card; one company reported a high figure of $500; the others
both reported an average figure of $200.
Three of these five companies asserted that their credit card holders
were liable for all amounts obtained as the result of unauthorized use of
their cards until notice was received by the company. Another company
reported that its holders were not liable, but because of other information
contained in its report it is obvious that this "no" should have been
"yes." Only one company stated that its holders were responsible for a
limited amount-the first $100.
Three of these companies reported that they had brought suit against
their holders for charges incurred as a result of unauthorized use. One
company did not furnish any information regarding this point, and the
fifth company stated that it had not brought suit. Two of the three
companies which had brought suit reported as to the average amount
claimed; one reported a figure of $500; the other reported a $200 amount.
The same three companies which reported bringing suit also reported on
their degree of successful prosecution. Two companies reported that
they had prevailed in every case, while the third said it had prevailed with
"only one exception." Two of these companies stated that approximately
one half of their holders paid for unauthorized charges made against
their cards before trial and the remaining one half after trial.
In contrast to the department store, oil company and airline issuers,
many of the independent issuers have made credit card insurance available
to their holders. One company gives automatic insurance protection to all
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cardholders covering all charges made with a stolen or found credit card
exceeding the first one hundred dollars. Another issuer offers insurance
protection which costs a premium of two dollars and sixty cents per year.
A third company offers insurance but it failed to state the amount of the
premium. A fourth company said it did not offer insurance protection, but
it was "often available as a rider to home owners' policies." The fifth
company offered no insurance, but inasmuch as this particular company
has never instituted suit against a holder for unauthorized charges the
omission of insurance protection would not seem dangerous insofar as
the holder is concerned.
The following table may place the above discussion in better perspective:
Company

No. of
Credit
Cards

A
B
C
D
E

1,800,000
1,500,000
500,000
500,000
12,000

4.

Percentage
Lost Each
Year

Percentage of
Lost Cards Used
Improperly

Monetary
Amounts

(+)
.019
12.0
.05
1-5 weekly

.05
.1 (-)
.025
2 cards

$500
200
200

'THE AUTOMOBILE CREDIT CARD ISSUERS

Inasmuch as only two nationally known automobile rental agencies,
National Car Rental System, Inc. and Avis Rent A Car System, Inc.,
responded to the author's questionnaire, no detailed discussion will be
made because it would be rather difficult to disguise the identity of the
companies with relationship to the statistics. It would appear, however,
from this rather incomplete sampling that despite the fact that these two
companies have approximately 4,000,000 credit cards outstanding, their
total loss from the improper use of credit cards is so minor that it would
not have any statistical relevance with other types of credit card issuers.
The fact that both these companies require the holder of a credit card to
identify himself before he rents an automobile would seem to have a
deterrent effect, although it is not completely effective. 6
5.

BANK CREDIT CARD ISSUERS

As mentioned in the beginning of this article, banks are now issuing
credit cards which enable the holder to receive "instant credit" up to a
specified amount, or to receive a specified dollar amount of checks which
may be cashed immediately. Because of the relative newness of this
system, it would appear that most banks are not in a position to supply
56. See, e.g., Richardson v. State, 193 So.2d 637 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967). For the crime of
obtaining goods by use of a false, expired or unauthorized credit card, see FLA. STAT. 817.481
(1967).
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statistics relative to unauthorized use. The author sought information
from the Detroit Bank and Trust Company, BankAmericard Center in
California, the Valley National Bank of Phoenix, Arizona and the Mellon
National Bank and Trust Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Two
of these banks reported that they were unable to answer the questionnaire
because of insufficient experience with this new system. Two others
reported tentative figures. One reported that approximately 1,400 cards
were reported lost or stolen each month and that approximately 25 to 30
of these cards were used by unauthorized persons each month. The average unauthorized user obtained $250. The other bank reported that
10 percent of its cards were reported lost or stolen during the average
year, and that approximately .1 percent of these cards were used by
unauthorized users. For some unexplained reason, unauthorized users of
this bank's credit cards only obtained an average of $38. One bank
stated that its credit card holders were liable for unauthorized use while
the other stated that they were not.
C. Suggestion and Conclusion
It is believed that most people carry credit cards because they want
to avoid carrying large amounts of cash rather than because they desire
to purchase goods and services on a time payment plan. If this is true,
the holder is not really getting what he bargained for because his possible
loss of cash may be outweighed, in many cases, by the monetary loss
suffered in the loss or theft of his credit cards. The underworld "market"
value of a stolen credit card is currently $250; 51 how many people carry
a like sum in cash in their wallets? Those companies which attempt to
shift the burden of unauthorized use to the holder want the best of all
possible worlds: they may obtain a fee from the holder, they may buy
the accounts receivable from the retailer at a discount, in some cases they
can lend money at interest from the collections, and they place the burden
of unauthorized use upon the holder. If the incidence of suits by issuers
against holders becomes widespread, people will be disinclined to use
credit cards.
On the other hand, those companies which do not, as a matter of
policy, attempt to shift the burden of loss to the holder suffer a large
economic loss as the result of unauthorized use.5 In brief, although the
interests of the holder may appear to be different from the interests of
the issuer, depending upon the recoupment policy of any particular
issuer, it is believed that there is a mutuality of interest among holders
and issuers in decreasing the incidence of unauthorized use. It is hoped
57. Spotlight on Schemes,

NATIOiAL BETTER BusinEss BUREAU, SPECIAL NEWS REPORT,

Oct., 1966.
58. Id. It is estimated that approximately twenty million dollars a year is lost through
the illegal use of credit cards.
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that some of the following suggestions will be feasible in satisfying this
mutual interest:
A. All credit cards should contain the signature of the holder.
It is interesting to note that only one of the oil companies
included in this survey reported that it requires the signature of the holder on the card, while only two of the other
twenty non-oil companies followed a similar policy. A simple
comparison of the signature on the credit card with the signature of the presenter on the credit invoice would be sufficient
in many cases to prevent unauthorized use. Of course, a
signature system would not be a panacea, but the present
system of honoring charge invoices without any possibility
of checking signatures is an invitation to steal.
B. All credit cards should bear a colored photograph of the
holder imbedded in tamper-proof plastic. The objection may
be made that it would be expensive to produce these cards.
However, on a mass production basis the cost per card should
be less than thirty cents exclusive of the cost of the colored
photograph which would be furnished by the applicant for
the card.59 It is believed that applicants would be happy
to furnish a colored photograph of the required size because
these cards could then be truly described as identification
cards. Thousands of high schools and colleges in the United
States have been issuing credit-card size identification cards
with photographs for years, hence the technical details are
not insurmountable. If one considers that one improper use
of an existing card for $10,000 is equal to what is would cost
to produce over 33,000 cards, the advantages would seem
obvious. Finally, if a credit company can charge as much as
$15 per year for a credit card, it should be able to devote
thirty cents of this fee to the production of a card which will
protect both parties.
C. If neither of the above suggestions are adopted, credit card
issuers (particularly in the oil industry) should abandon the
promiscuous give-away credit card system whereby cards are
mailed to people who have not solicited them. At least one
oil company uses large print on the envelope to advise the
addressee that the envelope contains valuable credit cards;
this is an invitation to thieves who pilfer letter boxes.
D. Larger rewards should be offered to employees of retail establishments which honor credit cards for the recovery of lost
or stolen cards. Some oil companies offer graduated rewards
for the recovery of stolen or lost cards. Employees of these
companies' retail gas stations have informed the author that
they memorize the names on those cards which carry the
59. Information supplied to the author by the purchasing department of the University
of Miami.
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greater reward; as one employee put it: "I memorizes (sic)
the $25 cards and the heck with those $5 cards." The present
practice of issuing bulletins each month, or every fifteen days
or every week to retail establishments notifying them of
lost or stolen credit cards is rather ineffectual because
virtually all employees of motels, restaurants, gas stations,
etc., who were interviewed by the author stated that they
were unable to compare a credit card against the "hot-list."
Their reasons, or excuses if you will, were that during the
press of business they did not have time to do it and if they
had time, "the customer would be insulted if he saw me do
it." The "insult" aspect can be obviated in restaurants, etc.,
where the customer gives up his card to a waiter who takes
it to the cashier who may possibly compare the card with the
"hot-list" out of the presence of the customer. However, a
similar approach may not be used in gas stations and retail
shops where everything transpires within the view of the
customer. It is believed that if the credit card companies
instituted an educational campaign to encourage their holders
to get used to the idea of a comparison of their cards with a
list for their own benefit, the "insult" aspect would be eliminated. After all, a stranger who asks to cash a check at a
retail store expects that he will have to prove his identity;
why should a holder of a credit card expect any less?
It may be argued that the author has a rather academic
knowledge of people, and that this suggestion would alienate
people and cause disenchantment with credit cards. A very
popular independent credit card company in the Miami,
Florida area has a policy requiring its contracting retail
establishments to telephone the credit company and receive
an approval on each purchase before extending credit on a
card. This telephone credit check, which is often made in the
presence of the card-holder, is designed to ascertain the
credit status of the holder's account rather than his identity.
It would seem that an inquiry into a credit card holder's
credit standing would be much more offensive than a check
into the status of the card itself, but this company has not
seemed to suffer from adverse public feeling. The credit card
industry is turning to computerized stolen credit card lists as
a speedy means of centralizing and communicating knowledge of stolen cards;6 ° however, until credit card holders
and employees of retail establishments become adjusted to
the notion that cards must be compared with lists, the speedy
dissemination of information will be futile.
E. Credit card issuers should offer inexpensive loss of credit
card insurance to their holders. The American Express Company insures its holders against loss exceeding $100 without
60. Note 6 supra.
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any additional charge. The Diner's Club offers a policy for
$2.40 per year covering losses up to $5,000 with a $100
deductible clause. Private insurance companies are issuing
policies covering losses of up to $5,000 at a premium of $5
per year, while others give protection limited to $1,000 per
year at a cost of $6 for a three-year policy. Only three companies of the twenty-eight which answered the author's questionnaire reported that they issued any form of insurance
against unauthorized use. Of course, these rates will probably
increase if the present spiral in the unauthorized use of cards
continues to climb.
F. The credit card industry should make a thoughtful reappraisal of some basic questions. For example, is the present
proliferation of credit cards in the oil industry really necessary? Do credit cards really increase the loyalty of a holder
to a particular oil company? The author holds credit cards
from four oil companies, but he does not trade at a gas station
selling products manufactured by these issuers, preferring
a gas station which gives him good service and which bills him
directly each month. Of course, the answer to this proliferation problem may be similar to the problem confronting the
grocery industry regarding the use of trading stamps-if
one store in the area gives stamps, then all of them must do so
(or think they must do so) to meet competition.
Some writers have advanced the view that new penal legislation is
need to curb the illegal use of credit cards. 6' These advocates of "there
ought to be a law" overlook the fact that the legislation dealing with
burglary and robbery has not seemed to reduce the use of safety deposit
boxes and burglar-proof safes; the remedy in this field does not lie in
punishing the misuser but rather in eliminating, or at least reducing, his
opportunity to misuse.
APPENDIX
QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Name of issuer of credit or charge card.
2. Approximate number of credit or charge cards presently in force.
61. Katz, Federal Prosecution for the Interstate Transportation of Stolen Credit Cards,
57 COLO. L. REV. 323 (1966); Comment, Credit Cards, Nw. U. L. REV. 207 (1962); Comment, Criminal Liability for the Unauthorized Use of a Credit Card, 7 ST. Louis U.L.J. 158
(1962) ; The Miami Herald, April 7, 1967, § A, at 11, col. 1; id., Feb. 7, 1967, at 14, col. 1.
More prosecutions under the existing laws might really be the answer, see The Miami Herald,
June 4, § D, at 11, col. 1.
In July, 1967, Florida enacted the State Credit Card Crime Act, Ch. 67-340, S.B. No.
1,002, 1967 Reg. Sess. This Act is a comprehensive attempt to punish the fraudulent procurement of credit cards from issuers, the theft and fraudulent retention of credit cards, and
the fraudulent use of credit cards. If the legislation has the deterrent effect of other criminal
legislation, this article will continue to be timely.
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3. What are the annual charges (for goods and services) incurred by
the average credit or charge card holder?
4. Approximately what percentage of your credit or charge cards are
reported lost or stolen during the average year?
5.

Approximately what percentage of the lost (or stolen) credit or
charge cards are improperly used during the average year?

6. What is the approximate amount of goods and services obtained by
the average unauthorized user of each lost or stolen credit or charge
card?
7.

Are the holders of your credit or charge cards liable for all amounts
obtained as the result of an unauthorized use of your card until
written notice is received by your office?

7a. Have you had occasion to institute suit against your card holders in
order to recover for charges made by unauthorized users (finders or
thieves) ?
7b. If you have instituted suit against your holders for charges made
by unauthorized users, what has been the average amount claimed
by you in the legal action?
7c. Have the trial and appellate courts ruled in your favor in all cases?
7d. When charges have been incurred as the result of unauthorized uses
of your credit cards or charge cards, what percentage of your holders have paid these charges voluntarily and what percentage did so
after suit was filed?
7e. Do you offer some form of theft insurance to the holders of your
cards? And, if so, what is the annual premium for this insurance?
8. Upon whom does the loss fall when a business establishment honors
your credit or charge after its loss has been reported to you but
before the establishment receives notice of the card's cancellation?
9. How often and by what means do you notify business establishments
of the cancellation of lost or stolen credit or charge cards?
9a. In instances where the national home office of a chain is not directly
involved in the billing of accounts (i.e., where a local office handles
the credit records of the card holder) how is official notification of
loss of the credit card handled?
(a)

Reported in writing to national office.

(b)

Reported in writing to nearest local office.
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(c)
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Reported in writing to local office containing the card
holder's records.

10. Do you require business establishments which honor your cards to
require that users identify themselves before goods or services are
rendered upon the strength of your cards?
lOa. Does your charge or credit card carry the signature of the holder on
it?
lob.

Does your credit or charge card carry the photograph of the holder
on it?

lOc. If your card carries neither the photograph nor the signature of the
holder, how does the business establishment honoring your card
identify the holder?

